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1. Introduction
On December 03, 1999, Mobilcom offered 23% (4
million shares) of its subsidiary Freenet through
an initial public offering (IPO). On the first trad-
ing day, the market value of Mobilcom was "3,
138.84 million, while its ownership stake in
Freenet was worth "1,334.03 million. In subse-
quent years this relationship changed. On Septem-
ber 13, 2002, the market value of Mobilcom’s
ownership stake in Freenet first exceeded the
market value of the Mobilcom stocks. After high
price losses, the Mobilcom stocks were worth only
"70.95 million, while Mobilcom’s ownership stake
in Freenet was worth "73.65 million. This devel-
opment climaxed on August 25, 2003, when the
market value of Mobilcom’s Freenet stake ex-
ceeded Mobilcom’s stock market value by about
31%. At that time, numerous buy recommendations
regarding Mobilcom were published.[1] Since then
the relationship between the market values of the
Mobilcom stocks and Mobilcom’s stake has
changed again. On September 03, 2003, the market
value of Mobilcom shares exceeded the market
value of its stake in Freenet. On December 30,
2003, Mobilcom was worth "839.67 million and
the ownership stake was valued at "551.75 million.
Situations where a firm’s market value is less
than the value of its ownership stake in a publicly
traded subsidiary are commonly referred to as
Bnegative stub values^[2] or Bparent company puz-
zles^[3]. According to MITCHELL/PULVINO/
STAFFORD (2002), p. 552, these situations sug-
gest clear arbitrage opportunities. Using data from
1985 through 2000, MITCHELL/PULVINO/
STAFFORD (2002) constructed a sample of 82
negative stub values for analysing the impedi-
ments to arbitraging relative mispricings of cor-
porate cross holdings. They concluded that a main
factor that prevents arbitrageurs from quickly
exploiting the mispricings and forcing prices to
fundamental values is the costs associated with
imperfect information. There is uncertainty about
both the number of negative stub value situations
which might be exploited and the magnitude of
these opportunities. Furthermore, there is uncer-
tainty about the distribution of returns of invest-
ment strategies based on negative stub values. In
addition, it might be difficult to say whether a
negative stub value is caused by a mispricing or
by fairly priced firms with, for example, major
off-balance sheet liabilities as a rational explana-
tion for the negative stub value. When the ex ante
benefits from identifying and exploiting negative
stub values are uncertain and the fixed costs of
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becoming informed are sufficiently large, arbitra-
geurs may not enter this business and quickly
force prices to fundamental values.
To shed some light on these uncertainty issues, we
have collected five years of German stock market
data from 1999 to 2003 and carefully analysed their
characteristics, much as MITCHELL/PULVINO/
STAFFORD (2002) have done. In the first step,
we constructed a sample of eleven cases where a
firm’s market value is less than the value of its
ownership stake in a publicly traded subsidiary.[4]
In the second step, we analysed the performance
of investment strategies based on negative stub
values. We considered two negative stub value
investment strategies: a Bparent long^ and a
Bsubsidiary long^ investment strategy. In order to
implement the investment strategies, we con-
structed buy and sell signals based on a value
ratio which is defined as the ratio between the
market value of the stake of the subsidiary’s
equity held by the parent and the market value
of the parent’s equity. For each parent/subsidiary
pair and for each point in time, we calculated the
value ratio and started an investment when the
value ratio exceeded a buy threshold. Normally,
the investment was terminated when the value
ratio fell below a sell threshold. We found that, on
average, the Bparent long^ investment strategy
produced a return of more than 20% in excess of
the return of a market index and the Bsubsidiary
long^ investment strategy produced an insignifi-
cantly negative excess return of 1.32%. Hence, on
average, only the stock price of the parent com-
pany converged, while the stock price of the
subsidiary changed with the market. This is an
interesting result because it supports the view that
the parent stocks are underpriced, and it does not
support the view that the subsidiaries are over-
priced because of short selling constraints.
Despite these positive results, negative stub value
investments are not risk-free investments. In at least
25% of the cases in which the value ratio exceeded
the buy threshold, it did not fall below the sell
threshold either within one year after the initial
investment date or as of December 30, 2003. In both
cases, the investments were terminated, although the
prices did not converge Tas expected or desired.
There are two explanations for these Bbad out-
comes^: First, the parent/subsidiary pair is mis-
priced and mispricing corrections take longer than
expected. Second, the firms are fairly priced and
there is a rational explanation for the negative stub
value.
In the literature, there are several potential expla-
nations for the parent company puzzle. For ex-
ample, CORNELL/LIU (2001) examined seven
instances of the parent company puzzle and tried
to explain these cases in terms of traditional
closed-end fund discount theories, which are taxes,
agency costs, liquidity effects, and noise trader
risk.[5] CORNELL/LIU (2001), p. 365, concluded
that these theories are not able to explain their
parent-company-puzzle examples. According to
CORNELL/LIU (2001), the only explanation
consistent with all the results is that the subsidiary
is overpriced because of short selling constraints.
This supports the explanation offered by many
practitioners. Short selling constraints and high
demand can produce irrationally high prices.
SCHILL/ZHOU (2001) and LAMONT/THALER
(2003) report similar findings.[6]
The remainder of the paper is organised as fol-
lows. Section 2 describes the data collected. In
Section 3, we define and implement negative stub
value investment strategies and report the returns
and risks of these investment strategies. In Section
4, we apply traditional closed-end fund discount
and other theories to our sample of negative stub
values. Section 5 contains the conclusion.
2. Determination of Negative Stub Values
2.1 Approach: Identification of Negative
Stub Values
The stub value is defined as the market value
(MV) of the parent’s equity less the market value
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of its ownership stake in a publicly traded
subsidiary less the market value of net other assets
(see formula (1)). The market value of net other
assets is defined as the market value of the
parent’s non-subsidiary (other) assets less the
parent’s unconsolidated liabilities.
Stub Value ¼ MVParent Equity  MVParent Stake
 MVParent Other Assets  MVParent Liabilitiesð Þ
|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
MVNet Other Assets
ð1Þ
When a stub value is negative, the parent/
subsidiary pair is included in our sample of parent
company puzzles. To determine whether the stub
value is negative, we use two different methods.
The first method assumes that the market value of
the parent’s other assets is equal to the market
value of the parent’s debt. Of course, this assump-
tion is problematic, but it is a first approx-
imation and it allows us to compare our results
to MITCHELL/PULVINO/STAFFORD (2002),
who use the same assumption.[7] The second
method assumes that the market value of the
parent’s net other assets can be calculated on the
basis of book values taken from balance sheets.
This assumption is problematic again because
book values may not exactly describe market
values. For example, off-balance sheet liabilities
are completely ignored. Nevertheless, the second
method may be a better approximation than the
first one and might explain a significant portion of
the stub value.
To construct a sample of negative stub value
situations, we use a two-stage selection process:
In the first stage, a preselection is carried out
using various databases in the internet (OnVista,
http://www.onvista.de, GoingPublic, http://www.
goingpublic-online.de, and Cortal Consors, http://
www.cortalconsors.de). In the second stage, the
sample is reviewed in detail using annual and
interim reports as well as stock data from Yahoo-
Finance (http://de.finance.yahoo.com).
In the first stage, companies are selected in two
different ways. It is known from other studies of
the parent company puzzle that negative stub val-
ues often arise following equity carve-outs.
Therefore, the analysis of all German IPOs be-
tween January 1999 and December 2003 is a
good starting point for determining negative stub
values. Using databases of OnVista and Going-
Public, we identify 26 carve-outs from 365 IPOs.
These 26 cases are examined in detail in the
second stage. To find further cases, a second pre-
selection is carried out, which uses data on
market capitalisation and ownership stakes of
German corporations from Cortal Consors. On
September 05, 2003, 302 corporations are listed in
the DAX 100, the SDAX, and the (former)
Nemax All Share. For a negative stub value to
come into question, a company needs to hold an
ownership stake in an exchange traded company.
For the 302 corporations, this is the case in 48
instances. Furthermore, the market value of the
parent’s stake must be significant relative to the
parent’s equity market value. To be selected in
the first stage, the market value of the stake must
at least be 33.33% of the parent’s equity market
value. Altogether 18 companies satisfy this con-
dition. Of these, five enterprises are already part
of the carve-out sample. Thus a sample of 39
parent/subsidiary pairs is the result of the first-
stage of the selection process.
In the second stage, all 39 potential negative stub
values are reviewed in detail. For this purpose, the
market capitalisation of the parent and the sub-
sidiary as well as the market value of the parent
company’s stake in the subsidiary are calculated
for each day between January 4, 1999, and
December 30, 2003. With this choice of time
period, all possible capital market conditions are
investigated: a sharp rise in the market (until
March 2000), the following slump (until March
2003), and finally the phase of recovering markets
(until December 2003). The data concerning the
number of shares outstanding and the number of
subsidiary shares held by the parent are obtained
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from annual and interim reports. The share prices
are taken from Yahoo Finance. Using the col-
lected data, we calculate the stub value under the
assumption that the market value of net other
assets is zero (our first method). Twelve of the
39 parent/subsidiary pairs show a negative stub
value in the examination period.
Finally, we consider the remaining twelve cases
in order to see whether their negative stub val-
ues might be explained by net other assets.
Using annual and interim reports, the market
values of net other assets are estimated on the
basis of book values (our second method). In
one case (Babcock Borsig and Schumag), the
investigation led to the exclusion of the parent/
subsidiary pair from the sample due to a high
level of indebtedness. Therefore, eleven instan-
ces of the parent company puzzle remain for
further examination.
2.2 Results: Companies with Negative
Stub Values
The sample consists of eleven parent/subsidiary
pairs. Table 1 lists for each pair the name of the
parent company and its subsidiary, the branches in
which the parent and subsidiary operate, the
percentage of shares held by the parent on
December 30, 2003, and the background informa-
tion on how the parent obtained its stake in the
subsidiary.[8]
In contrast to existing studies of the parent
company puzzle, which focus mainly on the
technology industry,[12] we find a balanced
mixture of companies belonging to the BOld
Economy^, e.g., engineering (Boewe Systec),
and the BNew Economy^, e.g., IT-Software
(USU Software). In the sample there are very
large companies, e.g., Allianz (market capital-
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Table 1: Sample of Parent /Subsidiary Pairs with Negative Stub Values
Case
Parent
(Branch)
Subsidiary
(Branch)
Percentage held by
Parent on 30/12/03 Background
1 Mobilcom AG
(Telecommunication)
Freenet.de AG
(Internet-Services)
52.89% Carve-out
03/12/99
2 Augusta Technologie AG
(IT-Services)
Pandatel AG
(Network-Technology)
57.90% Carve-out
02/11/99
3 Fresenius AG
(Medical Equipment)
Fresenius Medical Care AG
(Medical Equipment)
50.80%
(of the Ordinary Shares)
Carve-out
02/10/96
4 Wanderer Werke AG
(Holdings)
Boewe Systec AG
(Engineering)
51.00% Carve-out
03/04/92
5 USU Software AG
(IT-Software)
USU AG
(Special Software)
95.99% Acquisition
11/03/02
6 Media [Netcom] AG
(Entertainment)
Internolix AG
(Special Software)
95.10% Acquisition
04/07/01
7 TAG Tegernsee AG
(Real Estate)
Bau-Verein zu Hamburg AG
(Real Estate)
87.92% Acquisition
25/04/01
8 Essential Wagniskapital KGaA
(Financial Services)
November AG
(Biotechnology)
10.56% Acquisition
31/12/99
9 Allianz AG
(Insurance)
18 Subsidiaries [9]
(Diverse)
20.49%* Acquisition of
many stakes
10 Mu¨nchener Ru¨ck AG
(Insurance)
6 Subsidiaries [10]
(Diverse)
24.74%* Acquisition of
many stakes
11 WCM AG
(Real Estate)
4 Subsidiaries [11]
(Diverse)
58.90%* Acquisition of
many stakes
*: Average of all stakes.
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isation "38,413.69 million on December 30, 2003),
as well as very small companies, e.g., Augusta
(market capitalisation "33.60 million on December
30, 2003). In addition, all market segments are
contained in the sample, i.e., the prime standard
(e.g., Mu¨nchener Ru¨ck) and the general standard
(e.g., Bau-Verein zu Hamburg). In most cases (1
to 7 and 11), the percentage held by the parent is
very high. In cases 9, 10 and 11, a large number
of partially smaller stakes lead to a negative stub
value. For example, for Allianz (case 9), we find
18 subsidiaries, but the average stake is only
about 20.49%. Four of the eleven instances are
equity carve-outs. Moreover, in seven cases, the
negative stub value was created after acquiring a
stake in one or several subsidiaries.
Table 2 shows for each parent/subsidiary pair
the time period and duration (in trading days) of
the negative stub value situation as well as the
maximum and minimum value ratios between
January 4, 1999, and December 30, 2003. In the
following, this time period is called the sample
period or examination period.
The average duration of a negative stub value
situation is 244.91 trading days. Of course, this
time period with a negative stub value varies from
case to case. In some cases, the negative stub
value disappears after only one trading day (e.g.,
cases 3 and 5) while in other instances it lasts for
the entire examination period (e.g., case 4). In
addition, in many cases, a longer time period of
negative stub values is at least temporarily inter-
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Table 2: Negative Stub Values
Case
Parent /
Subsidiary Negative Stub Value Time Period Duration
Value Ratio
Minimum Maximum
1 Mobilcom/
Freenet
13/09/02, 03/04/03, 11/04/03 to 14/04/03,
30/06/03 to 02/09/03*, 11/09/03
46 0.06 1.31
2 Augusta Technologie/
Pandatel
09/12/99 to 03/11/00, 04/12/00 to 29/12/00,
08/10/02, 14/01/03, 27/01/03 to 07/02/03*,
20/02/03 to 14/03/03, 24/03/03 to 08/04/03*,
22/04/03 to 24/04/03, 17/06/03
287 0.37 1.82
3 Fresenius/
Fresenius Medical Care
27/03/03 1 0.61 1.00
4 Wanderer Werke/
Boewe Systec
04/01/99 to 30/12/03 1263 1.39 2.49
5 USU Software/
USU
01/10/03 1 0.36 1.06
6 Media [Netcom]/
Internolix
26/11/03 to 09/12/03* 8 0.18 1.12
7 TAG Tegernsee/
Bau-Verein zu Hamburg
20/12/02 to 27/12/02, 24/01/03 to 14/03/03*,
12/05/03 to 05/06/03*, 14/11/03 to 30/12/03
85 0.24 1.41
8 Essential Wagniskapital/
November
17/04/02 to 18/04/02, 03/06/02 to 20/06/02*,
28/06/02 to 06/01/03*, 19/05/03 to 30/12/03*
290 0.21 3.20
9 Allianz/
Diverse
01/08/02 to 09/06/03, 30/06/03 to 01/07/03 217 0.64 1.80
10 Mu¨nchener Ru¨ck/
Diverse
19/09/02 to 09/10/02*, 12/03/03, 27/03/03 to
16/04/03*, 20/05/03 to 26/05/03*, 09/06/03,
16/06/03 to 18/08/03*, 28/08/03 to 29/09/03*
94 0.63 1.20
11 WCM/
Diverse
15/05/02 to 31/05/02*, 17/06/02 to 30/12/03 402 0.54 6.16
Average 244.91 0.48 2.05
*: With brief interruptions (up to three trading days).
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rupted. The value ratio is also subject to large
fluctuations. While the average minimum value
ratio is 0.48, the average maximum ratio is 2.05.
3. Negative Stub Value Investments
In this section, the performance of investment
strategies based on parent company puzzle situa-
tions is analysed. Such strategies may represent
interesting investment opportunities, e.g., for hedge
funds that pursue event-driven strategies.[13]
Within these investments, we analyse whether a
speculation on changes in the pricing relationship
between parent and subsidiary may be an attractive
investment. Therefore we need to start and termi-
nate investments following certain criteria.
3.1 Implementing the Investment Strategy
To implement an investment strategy based on
negative stub values, we first define threshold
values which signal buy and sell decisions when
the value ratio of a particular parent/subsidiary pair
exceeds or falls below a threshold. In order to be
able to compare our results, we follow MITCH-
ELL/PULVINO/STAFFORD (2002) once again
and use three different buy and sell thresholds,
which are given in the following table (Table 3).
In the standard case, an investment is started when
the value ratio exceeds 1.00, and the investment is
terminated when the value ratio falls below
0.80.[14] A buy threshold of 1.00 implies that
the investor believes that the stock prices are
relatively mispriced because the market value of
the parent’s ownership stake in the subsidiary is
higher than the market value of the parent shares.
The moderate and cautious thresholds give the
investors some cushion over their estimates of
mispricing.[15]
Second, we consider two possible investment
strategies, a Bparent long^ and a Bsubsidiary long^
investment strategy. Table 4 shows the investment
strategies and the calculation of excess returns
for both investment strategies.
The investment strategies are based on the
expectation that, with the appearance of a negative
stub value, the parent’s and the subsidiary’s stock
prices are relatively mispriced and that the stock
prices converge in a way which eliminates the
mispricing. Therefore, a long position in the
parent in combination with a short position in
the subsidiary might be a promising investment
strategy. However, since many market participants
do not have the possibility of short selling and, in
some cases, short sales may not be at all possible,
we consider a long position in the parent and
compare this to a long position in the subsidiary.
Following the Bparent long^ investment strategy,
shares of the parent company are bought or sold
based on buy signals or sell signals, respectively.
Similarly, the Bsubsidiary long^ investment strat-
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Table 3: Buy and Sell Signals
Threshold Buy Signal Sell Signal
Standard Value Ratio > 1.00 Value Ratio G 0.80
Moderate Value Ratio > 1.25 Value Ratio G 1.00
Cautious Value Ratio > 1.50 Value Ratio G 1.00
Table 4: Investment Strategies
Strategy Arrangement Calculation of Excess Return
Parent Long Buy the Parent ERP ¼ RP  RCDAX ¼ PricePEX
PricePEN
 PriceCDAXEX
PriceCDAXEN
Subsidiary Long Buy the Subsidiary ERS ¼ RS  RCDAX ¼ PriceSEX
PriceSEN
 PriceCDAXEX
PriceCDAXEN
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egy requires buy and sell decisions regarding the
subsidiary’s stock. From the results of these two
strategies, conclusions about the success of a long-
short strategy can be drawn.
In order to correct the returns for market influences,
excess returns of the parent (ERP) and the sub-
sidiary (ERS) are calculated. The excess return is
computed as the difference between the return of
the parent (RP) or the subsidiary (RS) and the
return of the Composite DAX Performance Index
(RCDAX).[16] EN and EX denote the dates when
the stocks are bought (entry) and sold (exit). The
CDAX consists of all German companies listed in
the prime and general standard. It measures the
development of the entire German stock market
and therefore seems to be suitable for analysis
purposes.
The maximum investment period is one year. This
means that an investment is terminated either
when we receive a sell signal or 250 trading days
after initialisation. The investments which are not
sold until December 30, 2003, are automatically
liquidated at this date. Transaction costs are not
considered.[17] In cases with several subsidiaries
(e.g., Allianz with 18 subsidiaries) or several stock
categories (e.g., Fresenius ordinary and preference
shares), an equal weighted investment is made in
the respective subsidiaries or stock categories.
Returns are calculated using the adjusted closing
prices offered by Yahoo Finance (corrected for
dividends and splits). Using a parametric t-test and
a non-parametric sign rank test according to
Wilcoxon, the excess returns of all investments
are tested for statistical significance.[18]
3.2 Performance of Negative Stub Value
Investments
At first, the performance of the two investment
strategies is analysed for the standard thresholds.
The results for the standard thresholds are subse-
quently consolidated and compared with the other
buy and sell thresholds. Table 5 describes the
investment decisions for the standard case. In the
first column, all investments are numbered. The
second column (together with Table 2) describes
the company which is bought and sold in each
investment. The third and fourth columns show
the dates at which the investments are started and
terminated. The fifth column gives the holding
period, which is defined as the number of trading
days between the buy and sell decision. The sixth
column shows the maximum value ratio during the
holding period. In order to calculate the excess
return of each investment, the return of an
investment in the CDAX is given in the seventh
column. Finally, the last four columns show both
the non-adjusted returns and the excess returns for
each investment. In addition, we calculate the
results of the t-test and the sign rank test.
On the basis of the standard thresholds, 24
investments are started. For 18 of these 24 invest-
ments, the mispricing is eliminated within 250
trading days after the initial investment date. That
corresponds to a convergence ratio of 75%. The
remaining six positions are liquidated automat-
ically: three of them because the maximum in-
vestment period of one year is reached, the other
three because the end of the sample period (30/
12/03) is reached. The average holding period
(including the unsuccessful investments) is 81.75
trading days. A high holding period variation
from 1 to 250 trading days can be observed. All
Bparent long^ investments which are regularly
terminated produce high excess returns. But in
the case of a compulsory liquidation, these in-
vestments are less successful. A positive excess
return can be earned only in one of six cases.
An average excess return of 25.97% is produced
by a long position in the parent’s shares.[19] This is
significant for both test statistics. In contrast, the
long positions in the subsidiary’s shares show, on
average, an insignificantly negative excess return
of 1.32%. As expected or desired, the Bparent long^
strategy produces a positive excess return, and the
Bsubsidiary long^ strategy a negative excess
return. Obviously, a price adjustment takes place
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especially at the parent company. However, the
high excess return of the parent stocks is accom-
panied by a high risk. On the one hand, there are
cases where the capital employed could be more
than doubled (e.g., number 1); on the other hand,
very high losses may also occur (e.g., number 24).
Apart from the risk that the sell criterion is not
reached within the given time interval, the varia-
tion of prices during an investment is also an
important risk factor. This can be explained by
considering the maximum value ratio. After
starting an investment, it is subject to strong
fluctuations and, on average, rises to a maximum
of 1.52. In particular with a long-short strategy,
which requires the deposit of collateral because of
the short selling, a high value ratio can lead to an
additional payment obligation. If the subsidiary’s
share price does not fall as expected, the collateral
might fall below the required maintenance margin.
Then the investor would be faced with a margin
call and would therefore have to either reduce his
position or deposit additional collateral in order to
satisfy the maintenance margin requirements. This
would reduce the excess returns of the long-short
strategy.
In Table 6, the returns of the investments in the
standard case are analysed for different market
conditions. For this reason, the 24 investments are
divided in two sub-groups: one group contains all
investments in rising markets, and the other group
contains all investments which are carried out in
falling markets. Besides the number of invest-
ments, the table also shows the average values for
the holding period, the maximum value ratio, as
well as returns and excess returns.
The results for the standard case seem to be
independent of the market condition. When
comparing the investments in rising and falling
markets, neither the holding period nor the
maximum value ratio changes significantly. The
excess returns of the Bparent (subsidiary) long^
investment strategy slightly decrease (increase)
with rising markets, whereas with falling markets
they slightly increase (decrease). However, alto-
gether the differences are small. Therefore, the
influence of market conditions on negative stub
value investments is negligible.[20]
In Table 7, the results of the standard thresholds
are compared with those of the other buy and sell
thresholds. Comparison criteria are the number of
investments with the associated convergence
ratios (defined as the ratio of regularly terminated
investments to all investments), the investment
holding period (in trading days) up to the termi-
nation of the investment, and the maximum value
ratio. Furthermore, the excess return averages for
the Bparent long^ and Bsubsidiary long^ investment
strategies are compared. Their significance is
examined using the t-test and the sign rank test.
Table 7 shows that with increasing buy threshold
the number of investments decreases. While the
standard buy threshold 1.00 is reached 24 times,
the moderate (cautious) thresholds of 1.25 (1.50)
are reached only 16 (6) times. The convergence
ratio is constant at first, but then declines with
increasing buy threshold. This can be explained by
the increasing spread between buy and sell thresh-
olds. Thus, at the moderate threshold with a spread
of 0.25, 75% of all investments still converge; at
the cautious signals with a spread of 0.50, only
FINANCIAL MARKETS AND PORTFOLIO MANAGEMENT / Volume 19, 2005 / Number 1 15
Table 6: Selected Characteristics for the Investments for Standard Thresholds in Different Market
Conditions
Market Condition
Number of
Investments
Holding
Period
Maximum
Value Ratio RCDAX
‘‘Parent Long ’’ ‘‘Subsidiary Long ’’
RP ERP RS ERS
All Positions 24 81.75 1.52 6.21% 32.18% 25.97% 4.89% j1.32%
Rising Markets 15 80.27 1.43 17.45% 40.14% 22.68% 19.83% 2.37%
Falling Markets 9 83.93 1.64 j9.54% 21.04% 30.58% j16.02% j6.48%
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50%. Initially, the holding period remains constant,
but with increasing spread between buy and sell
criterion, it also increases. Similarly, the maximum
value ratio follows the level of the buy signal and
increases from standard to cautious thresholds.
Both for the number of trading days and with the
maximum value ratio, a very high standard devia-
tion of the individual values can be observed.
Within all buy and sell signals, the Bparent long^
investment strategy obtains high excess returns of
up to 39.65%. The excess returns are statistically
significant at the standard and moderate thresholds.
Although the highest excess return arises with
cautious signals, this is not significant due to the
high standard deviation of the excess returns and
the small sample size. The Bsubsidiary long^
investment strategy always obtains insignificantly
negative excess returns of j0.11% (moderate) to
j1.32% (standard). The results with the moderate
and cautious signals confirm the observations with
the standard signals: the parent stock always
obtains a positive excess return, and the subsidiary
stock always a negative excess return. In particular
the price of the parent company shares converges
because the excess returns of the subsidiary shares
are very small compared to those of the parent.
Altogether, statistically significant excess returns
can be obtained by negative stub value invest-
ments. The parent stocks offer promising invest-
ment opportunities. The purchase of the parent
stocks is superior to the purchase of the subsidiary
stocks. Obviously, in our case, a strategy of buying
the parent and shorting the subsidiary (longYshort
strategy) is unattractive. On the one hand, price
adjustments take place especially at the parent, but
not at the subsidiary. On the other hand, with a
longYshort strategy, additional payment obligations
must be taken into account. These obligations do
not exist for a long-only investment in the parent
shares. Therefore, the purchase of the parent stocks
is also superior to a longYshort strategy.[21]
4. Explanations for Negative Stub Values
The results of the previous section support the
view that some of the parent/subsidiary pairs were
indeed mispriced. In this section, we apply
traditional closed-end fund discount and other
theories to our sample of negative stub values.
First, we want to determine whether the negative
stub values which did not converge can be
explained by rational theories. Second, we analyse
whether the stub values which did converge can
also be explained by rational theories.
Explanations for the parent company puzzle can be
derived from the closed-end fund discount discus-
sion. In order to explain the divergence between the
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Table 7: Comparison of Different Thresholds
Buy/Sell Thresholds
Standard
(Value Ratio 1.00/0.80)
Moderate
(Value Ratio 1.25/1.00)
Cautious
(Value Ratio 1.50/1.00)
Investments (Terminated Regularly) 24 (18) 16 (12) 6 (3)
Convergence Ratio 75.00% 75.00% 50.00%
Holding Period Average 81.75 75.25 151.50
Standard Deviation 89.99 95.45 94.96
Maximum Value Ratio Average 1.52 1.79 2.51
Standard Deviation 0.73 0.77 0.88
‘‘Parent Long’’ Average ERP 25.97% 21.36% 39.65%
T-Test /Sign-Test 2.42**/235** 2.04*/103* 0.93/13
‘‘Subsidiary Long’’ Average ERS j1.32% j0.11% j1.31%
T-Test/Sign-Test j0.18/112 j0.02/62 j0.07/10
*/**/***: Significant at ! = 0.1/0.05/0.01.
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value of a fund and the value of its holdings,
MAKIEL (1977) addresses the aspects of taxes,
liquidity, and agency costs. LEE/SHLEIFER/
THALER (1991) additionally consider noise trad-
ing as an explanation. CORNELL/LIU (2001),
SCHILL/ZHOU (2001), and LAMONT/THALER
(2003) examine whether these aspects can explain
the parent company puzzle. Furthermore, they
review off-balance sheet claims as a possible
explanation.
Therefore, the following discussion concentrates
on five factors: taxes, liquidity, agency costs,
noise trading, and off-balance sheet claims. In
the following section, it is discussed whether these
aspects can explain the results of Section 3.
4.1 Taxes
Two different suggestions have been given to
explain the role taxes play in the puzzle: the aspects
of unrealised capital gains and tax-timing options.
As proposed by MAKIEL (1977), unrealised
capital gains may be one explanation for the
closed-end fund discount. An investor buying into
the fund is also buying a capital gain on the
securities of the fund which was obtained in the
past but as yet is unrealised. This capital gain must
be taxed at the time of realisation. Due to
additional fiscal charges in relation to a direct
investment into the underlying shares, fund prices
might trade at a discount to net asset value.
Although the relationship between the closed-end
fund and its stakes is comparable with the
relationship between the parent and its subsidiary,
there are two differences. On the one hand, the
stake holding of the parent is usually based on
long-term considerations. Thus, the parent firm
has (contrary to the closed-end fund) no direct
incentive to sell the subsidiary stock so that no
taxable capital gain appears. On the other hand,
there are mechanisms for avoiding taxation in the
case of distribution of the subsidiary shares. Under
certain conditions, parent companies from the
USA do not have to pay taxes on the sale of a
stake, e.g., if they spin off the shares following the
requirements of section 355 of the Federal tax
code.[22] That is why unrealised capital gains
cannot explain the parent company puzzle.
These arguments are also relevant for the eleven
cases in the German capital market. On the one
hand, the stakes are mostly long-term, as only a
few changes in the participation conditions were
observed within the examination period.[23] On
the other hand, the institutional settings in Ger-
many also offer the possibility of selling a stake
without generating additional fiscal charges for
the investors. Since January 2002, according to the
corporation tax act (Ko¨rperschaftssteuergesetz)
Section 8b Paragraph 2, there is a tax exemption
for profits made by corporations through the sale
of their holdings.[24] Thus, German corporations
have no fiscal disadvantages, at least since 2002.
Since the law change was already decided upon in
2000, it might be assumed that the advantages of
the new legal situation were already taken into
account in the stock prices before 2002. Therefore,
this approach also does not explain negative stub
values for the German sample.
A further tax-related aspect is discussed by
CONSTANTINIDES (1983). Capital gains are
subject to taxation only at the time of sale of a
stake. Therefore, an investor can minimise the pre-
sent value of his fiscal charges by timing his sales.
However, since investors maintain such an option
both with a direct investment (into the underlying
securities) and with an indirect investment (into the
fund), a price discount must be due to a difference
in the volatility of the two investments. Accord-
ingly, in the case of the closed-end fund discount,
the volatility of the fund has to be compared with
that of its stakes. Since the value of an option
increases with the volatility of the underlying
share, the fund must exhibit a smaller volatility
than its holdings in order to justify a discount.
Consequently, in the case of the parent company
puzzle, the volatility of the parent company shares
has to be compared with that of the subsidiary
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shares. If the volatility of the parent is less than
the volatility of the subsidiary, a smaller value of
the tax-timing option could be a reason for the
discount. In American studies, the approach of the
tax-timing option is generally rejected. At best, a
small fraction of the discount can be attributed to
such considerations.[25]
In Table 8, the volatilities (defined as the standard
deviations of the daily returns) in the sample
period for the eleven German parent/subsidiary
pairs are compared with each other.
On average, the volatility of the parent (4.72%) is
0.57% higher than the volatility of the subsidiary
(4.15%). Thus, a contrary effect could be justified,
i.e., the shares of the subsidiaries should be
evaluated at a discount.[26] Even for the cases
where the volatility of the subsidiary is higher
(cases 2, 4, 5 and 6), the difference is so small that
it can hardly justify the negative stub value.
Therefore, neither unrealised capital gains nor
tax-timing options seem to be meaningful explan-
ations for the puzzle.
4.2 Liquidity
Another explanation could be the difference in the
liquidity between a direct (into the securities of
the fund/in the subsidiary) and an indirect invest-
ment (in the fund/in the parent). Thus, in the
framework of the block discount hypothesis, the
closed-end fund discount reflects the expected
price reduction if a large block of shares is sold on
the open market within a short period of time.[27]
In addition, the liquidity can be limited by legal
restrictions, e.g., if shares may not be sold due to
contractual agreements. MAKIEL (1977) presents
evidence that a part of the closed-end fund
discount can be explained by the fact that funds
hold non-liquid or contractually blocked shares.
The higher the portion of these shares, the higher
is the discount.
In American studies on the parent company
puzzle, the liquidity argument is rejected. On the
one hand, the liquidity of the subsidiaries is small
neither in absolute terms nor relative to the parent.
On the other hand, no considerable blocked shares
were observed.[28]
In this point, the German sample differs from the
American samples. First, blocked shares can be
identified. In case 1 (Mobilcom and Freenet), the
Mobilcom shares of the company founder, Ger-
hard Schmid, were administered by a trustee from
November 2002 to September 2003. Before March
2003 a sale of this block of shares (42.42% or 28
million shares) was not possible. In the following
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Table 8: Volatility in the Sample Period
Case Parent Standard Deviation Subsidiary Standard Deviation
1 Mobilcom 9.29% Freenet 6.05%
2 Augusta Technologie 5.42% Pandatel 6.21%
3 Fresenius 2.62%* Fresenius Medical Care 2.54%
4 Wanderer Werke 2.02% Boewe Systec 2.23%
5 USU Software 2.26% USU 2.70%
6 Media [Netcom] 6.45% Internolix 8.49%
7 TAG Tegernsee 3.64% Bau-Verein zu Hamburg 2.57%
8 Essential Wagniskapital 8.61% November 6.11%
9 Allianz 3.31% Diverse 2.43%**
10 Mu¨nchener Ru¨ck 3.53% Diverse 3.28%**
11 WCM 4.80% Diverse 3.05%**
Average 4.72% 4.15%
* : Average of ordinary and preference shares.
**: Average of all stakes.
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period until September 2003, the entire block was
sold at the stock exchange. The effect of these
sales is illustrated in Figure 1. The figure shows
the value of the Mobilcom shares, the value of the
Freenet stake, and the resulting stub value for the
period of July 1, 2002 to December 30, 2003.
Although the share prices of both companies
increased in a rising market between April 1,
2003, and September 30, 2003, the value of the
stake in Freenet first increased disproportionately
to the value of the Mobilcom shares. This led to a
negative stub value of up to "196.28 million.
The negative stub value might be explained by the
block discount hypothesis. In September 2003, the
Mobilcom share closed this gap. Probably, the
largest portion of the block of shares was already
sold at this time. Interestingly, Mobilcom sold
20% of the Freenet stake on September 18, 2003.
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Figure 1: Stub Value in Case 1 (Mobilcom and Freenet).
Table 9: Trading Volume (Absolute and Relative) in the Sample Period
Case Parent
Trading Volume
Subsidiary
Trading Volume
Absolute Relative Absolute Relative
1 Mobilcom 968,049 1.473% Freenet 142,095 0.792%
2 Augusta 149,262 1.244% Pandatel 95,628 1.323%
3 Fresenius 99,040* 0.242% Fresenius Medical Care 566,774 0.589%
4 Wanderer Werke 1,215 0.047% Boewe Systec 15,811 0.262%
5 USU Software 8,948 0.052% USU 168 0.003%
6 Media [Netcom] 85,787 0.339% Internolix 55,039 0.405%
7 TAG Tegernsee 10,193 0.180% Bau-Verein zu Hamburg 9,315 0.110%
8 Essential Wagniskapital 40,171 0.210% November 123,196 1.649%
9 Allianz 2,186,177 0.570% Diverse 1,631,756** 0.494%
10 Mu¨nchener Ru¨ck 1,974,350 1.105% Diverse 1,860,876** 0.329%
11 WCM 1,404,383 0.486% Diverse 998,245** 0.537%
Average 629,779 0.541% 499,900 0.590%
*: Sum of ordinary and preference shares.
**: Average of all stakes.
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Obviously, Mobilcom was conscious of the
favourable pricing relationship and exploited this
opportunity by selling a part of its shares.[29]
Second, we compare the average daily trading
volume of the stocks in our sample and identify one
case which might be explained by the block discount
hypothesis. Table 9 shows the absolute trading
volume (i.e., number of shares) and the relative
trading volume (i.e., number of shares relative to the
issued shares) for both parents and subsidiaries at the
Frankfurt stock exchange in the sample period.
On average, the trading volume of the parent
companies (629,779 shares) exceeds the trading
volume of the subsidiaries (499,900 shares) by
approx. 26%, while the trading volume relative to
the issued shares is comparable (0.541% versus
0.590%). However, this number is mainly driven
by three very large values (cases 9, 10, 11).[30] In
addition, it should be noted that, in the context of
the block discount hypothesis, the relationship of
the trading volume of the parent to the subsidiary
is not of crucial importance. Rather, the price re-
duction from the sale of a large block of shares
depends on the absolute trading volume. The trad-
ing volume is low for only one of the eleven sub-
sidiary companies: in the case of USU (trading
volume 168 shares per day or 0.003% of the issued
shares), a sale of a block of shares would definitely
have an impact on the share price. Hence, the li-
quidity argument can explain the puzzle in this case.
Thus the liquidity argument appears to be a
suitable explanation for cases 1 and 5. At least a
part of the negative stub values can be explained
by this approach. However, liquidity is unlikely to
justify the pricing behaviour of the other cases
considered in our study.
4.3 Agency Costs
The relationship between owners and managers of
a firm represents a typical example of a principal-
agent relationship. The owners (principals) assign
the managers (agents) with the leadership of their
company. The agency theory analyses numerous
conflicts of interest between the two groups.
Following Jensen’s free cash flow hypothesis,
managers have an incentive to invest free cash
flow in unprofitable assets instead of giving it to
the owners.[31] Furthermore, managers of diver-
sified companies destroy value for the owners by
subsidising inefficient divisions.[32] This oppor-
tunistic behaviour leads to additional costs for the
owners, called agency costs. Due to agency costs,
diversified companies can be worth less than the
sum of their individual parts. In the case of the
closed-end fund, agency costs are represented by
the difference between the benefits and the costs
from the management of the fund.[33]
With respect to the parent company puzzle, the
agency theory points out that the value of the sub-
sidiary can exceed the value of the parent if the
parent invests the cash flow from the subsidiary
inefficiently or uses it for the preservation of
inefficient divisions. It is therefore crucial whether
the parent holds a large and controlling block of
shares and controls the cash flow of the subsidi-
ary. If the parent controls the cash flow, their
behaviour not only reduces the value of the parent,
but also that of the subsidiary. As a result, agency
costs cannot be avoided by a direct stake in the
subsidiary. Only if the parent does not control the
cash flow, can agency costs be an explanation for
the puzzle. In American studies, agency costs are
rejected since in most cases the parent controls the
cash flow. In those instances where the parent
does not have control rights, the studies show that
the subsidiary generates a negative cash flow.[34]
Thus, the subsidiary consumes the cash of the
parent, instead of making cash available.
In our sample, most parents control the subsidiary
cash flow. In eight cases, the parent possesses the
majority of votes.[35] With this majority, they can
actively affect the business policy of the subsid-
iary so that no agency costs can be avoided by a
direct stake in the subsidiary. However, in the
cases 9 (Allianz) and 10 (Mu¨nchener Ru¨ck), agency
costs can be used to explain the negative stub values.
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Both are large insurance companies which tried to
decrease their stake network because of efficiency
considerations in the last few years.[36] In these
instances, the agency theory is a quite plausible
explanation. This also applies to Essential Wagnis-
kapital (case 8), which made numerous unsuccess-
ful investments in the field of the technology
industry. However, a general influence of agency
costs on all cases should be rejected.
4.4 Noise Trading
According to LEE/SHLEIFER/THALER (1991),
the closed-end fund discount reflects risk induced
by the activity of noise traders. Their analysis is
based on the model of DE LONG/SHLEIFER/
SUMMERS/WALDMAN (1990). In this model,
market participants are divided into two groups:
rationally acting investors and noise traders. The
latter base their expectations on noise (e.g.,
rumours). The analysis of LEE/SHLEIFER/THA-
LER (1991) rests upon three assumptions. First,
noise traders hold and trade more shares of the
fund than shares of the underlying. Second, noise
trader actions change randomly over time but are
correlated across different securities. Third, there
exist impediments to arbitrage which prevent ra-
tionally acting arbitrageurs from eliminating the
mispricing. Under these conditions, they show that
an investor in a closed-end fundVapart from the
risk of the underlying sharesValso bears a high
noise trader risk. Thus, the investment into the
closed-end fund is riskier than the direct invest-
ment. Therefore, the fund must be traded at a dis-
count to its net asset value.
In American studies on the parent company
puzzle, a certain explanation value is attached to
the noise trader approach. CORNELL/LIU (2001),
p. 360, consider a combination of the noise trader
demand and impediments to short selling as the
best explanation for the puzzle. On the one hand,
the free float of the subsidiary is small compared
to the parent in their sample. On the other hand,
they find high costs associated with security
lending. As long as the demand for shares of the
subsidiary is large, the free float is small, and
arbitrage costs prevent the elimination of a mis-
pricing, an anomaly can occur and remain for a
longer time. High demand and short sale restric-
tions lead to large price fluctuations and thus to
negative stub value situations.
Table 10 lists the free float of the shares in our
sample on December 30, 2002. The data are taken
FINANCIAL MARKETS AND PORTFOLIO MANAGEMENT / Volume 19, 2005 / Number 1 21
Table 10: Free Float
Case Parent Free Float Subsidiary Free Float
1 Mobilcom 29.30% Freenet 27.11%
2 Augusta Technologie 93.00% Pandatel 35.50%
3 Fresenius 14.56%* Fresenius Medical Care 49.20%
4 Wanderer Werke 42.88% Boewe Systec 40.62%
5 USU Software 74.10% USU 4.01%
6 Media [Netcom] 40.90% Internolix 4.90%
7 TAG Tegernsee 80.00% Bau-Verein zu Hamburg 12.08%
8 Essential Wagniskapital 49.90% November 82.06%
9 Allianz 71.00% Diverse 28.16%**
10 Mu¨nchener Ru¨ck 74.30% Diverse 35.85%**
11 WCM 55.06% Diverse 24.80%**
Average 56.82% 31.30%
*: Average of ordinary and preference shares.
**: Average of all stakes.
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from the business reports and from the investor
relations information of the corporations involved.
Along the lines of CORNELL/LIU (2001), the
free float of the subsidiaries (31.30%) is, on
average, smaller than the free float of the parents
(56.82%).[37] For example, in the case of USU
(case 5), only 4.01% of the shares are in free float.
This also corresponds to a small trading volume of
168 shares per day. But there are also subsidiaries
with a very high free float in the sample. For ex-
ample, 49.20% of the shares of Fresenius Medical
Care (case 3) are available as free float. With a
trading volume of over 500,000 shares per day,
the subsidiary of Fresenius is one of the most
liquid shares in the sample.
There is little information available concerning the
possibilities and costs of security lending in
Germany. In contrast to the American capital
market, where the security lending business has
already existed for several decades, security lend-
ing in Germany is quite new. Only since 1990 has
the German Cash Association (Deutscher Kassen-
verein) offered the possibility of lending securities
for a fee.[38] In the meantime, the market for
security lending in Germany has developed further.
The size of the market is estimated to be approx-
imately "150 billion per year.[39] The lending
business is arranged by an internationally stand-
ardised basic agreement for security lending.[40]
However, there are only few institutions which of-
fer the execution and completion of security lend-
ing.[41] Rather, central securities depositories,
security collecting banks, and clearing houses
might be chosen as counter party for a borrow-
er.[42] The costs of security lending are based
individually on the market condition and the ne-
gotiating position of the contract parties.
In principle, short selling of the shares in the
sample seems possible. However, it is especially
questionable in the case of less liquid shares
whether a sufficient number of shares can be lent
at appropriate costs. For that reason, it might
barely be possible to sell short shares of USU,
while this is certainly possible with shares of
Fresenius Medical Care. Therefore, in individual
cases, it is conceivable that a change of the pricing
relationship is prevented due to the impediments
to short selling or due to high costs of security
lending. However, a detailed analysis is not
possible due to a lack of data concerning the pos-
sibilities and the costs of security lending. In
general, the approach of noise trading appears to
be a suitable explanation for the puzzle in in-
dividual instances, but a conclusive statement is
not yet possible.
4.5 Off-Balance Sheet Claims
SCHILL/ZHOU (2001) look at two problem areas
which explain the parent company puzzle using
off-balance sheet claims. First, a subsidiary is
protected against potential legal liabilities of the
parent. Second, the equity of the parent might
be diluted by derivative financial instruments,
such as stock options for staff members or con-
vertible bonds. Then the calculated market cap-
italisation does not correspond to the real mar-
ket capitalisation.
If investors anticipate large potential liabilities for
the parent but expect that the subsidiary is
shielded from any such claims, then the parent
might trade at a discount in comparison to the
subsidiary. In our case, this approach provides a
suitable explanation for the negative stub values
of three companies in financial or operational dis-
tress. Mobilcom (case 1) could barely avoid
insolvency in September 2002 after France Tele-
com cancelled an important cooperation contract.
The collapse was only averted with the support of
the Federal Government of Germany.[43] Essen-
tial Wagniskapital (case 8) first had to accept high
losses due to unsuccessful investments in the
technology industry during 2001 and 2002. Then
bad information politics and inquiries about the
managing director led to a lack of confidence by
most shareholders.[44] Today, WCM (case 11)
still suffers from an analyst study done in June
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2002 which reported alleged falsification of the
balances and the subsequent credit shortage.[45]
In all three examples, the bad news caused a
slump in the stock prices of the parent, while
the shares of the subsidiary were not affected.
This might have led to the negative stub
values.
Off-balance derivative financial instruments, such
as stock options or convertible bonds, can bias the
equity market value. To investigate the importance
of derivative financial instruments, the market
value of all outstanding contingent claims on
securities has to be estimated. For the available
sample, all data on stock options and convertible
bonds on December 30, 2002, were collected from
the business reports of the companies involved.
Table 11 contrasts the issued and the potential
shares for all companies in our sample.
We only find one company where the potential
shares reach a considerable level compared with
the number of issued shares. At Augusta, two
million potential shares face twelve million issued
shares. However, both stock options and conver-
sion price are far out of the money, so that an
execution of the claims and an increase in capital
are improbable. Thus, despite the issue of con-
vertible bonds, Augusta does not report dilution in
the earnings per share in its business report because
the stock price (December 30, 2003: "2.80) is far
below the conversion price ("42.30). For that
reason, there is no considerable dilution of the
determined market values. The impact of deriva-
tive financial instruments is not sufficient to
explain the observed value ratios.
5. Summary
In this paper, we investigated the German stock
market between January 4, 1999, and December
30, 2003, with regard to negative stub values or
parent company puzzles. These are situations
where a firm’s market value is less than the value
of its ownership stake in a publicly traded
subsidiary. According to MITCHELL/PULVINO/
STAFFORD (2002), negative stub values indicate
clear arbitrage opportunities, which sometimes
exist and persist. The authors find that uncertainty
about both the characteristics of negative stub
value investments and the risks of these invest-
ment strategies limit arbitrage. In 16 years of data,
MITCHELL/PULVINO/STAFFORD were able to
find 82 examples of negative stub values. In five
years, we were able to find 11 opportunities while
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Table 11: Issued and Potential Shares
Case Parent
Issued
Shares
(in Million)
Potential
Shares
(in Million) Subsidiary
Issued
Shares
(in Million)
Potential
Shares
(in Million)
1 Mobilcom 65.70 0.50 Freenet 17.95 0.49
2 Augusta 12.00 1.94 Pandatel 7.23 0.04
3 Fresenius 40.97* 1.24* Fresenius Medical Care 96.19 2.09
4 Wanderer Werke 2.60 0.00 Boewe Systec 6.04 0.06
5 USU Software 17.21 0.00 USU 5.74 0.34
6 Media [Netcom] 25.34 0.39 Internolix 13.59 0.00
7 TAG Tegernsee 5.66 0.00 Bau-Verein zu Hamburg 8.45 0.50
8 Essential Wagniskapital 19.10 0.11 November 7.47 0.12
9 Allianz 383.75 0.14 Diverse 330.34** 2.38**
10 Mu¨nchener Ru¨ck 178.67 0.00 Diverse 566.03** 15.14**
11 WCM 288.83 1.33 Diverse 186.06** 0.19**
* : Sum of ordinary and preference shares.
**: Average of all stakes.
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restricting the analysis to the German stock
market. Taking into account the length of the
time periods and the size of the American versus
the German stock market, the numbers of negative
stub values seem to be comparable. Furthermore,
MITCHELL/PULVINO/STAFFORD (2002) find
that 30% of the time the negative stub value in-
vestments terminate without convergence of the
prices. In our sample, about 25% of the cases
terminate before the mispricings are eliminated.
Again, these numbers seem to be comparable.
In contrast to our study, MITCHELL/PULVINO/
STAFFORD (2002) find that the investment strat-
egy Bparent long^ produces no abnormal returns,
while the strategy Bsubsidiary long^ produces a
reliably negative return. From these results, the
authors conclude that the subsidiary shares are
overpriced before market forces push them back to
fundamentals. In our study, we find quite the op-
posite. On average, the Bparent long^ investment
strategy produces a return of more than 20% in
excess of the return of a market index and the
Bsubsidiary long^ investment strategy produces an
insignificantly negative excess return of 1.32%. Of
course, our results need to be judged carefully due
to the small sample size. But the results suggest that
that the parent company share somehow became
underpriced before market forces pushed them
back to fundamentals. This finding supports the
view that uncertainty and the costs associated with
imperfect information appear to be the biggest
friction impeding arbitrage.[46]
In order to complement our analysis, we applied
different traditional closed-end fund discount and
other theories to our sample of negative stub
values. Different explanations such as taxes, li-
quidity, agency costs, noise trading, and off-
balance sheet claims were presented and discussed
under consideration of the institutional settings in
Germany. We found that two of the three negative
stub values (case 9 and 11) in which the prices did
not converge as desired could be explained by
agency costs and off-balance sheet claims. We
found no explanation for the negative stub value
in case 4. Of the investments which did converge,
one half (case 1, 5, 8, and 10) could be explained
by rational theories, while the other half (case 2, 3,
6, and 7) could not be explained.[47]
To conclude, this study supports the view of
MITCHELL/PULVINO/STAFFORD (2002), that
mispricings exist and persist because of costs
associated with imperfect information. Due to
imperfect information, the ex ante expected profits
of finding and exploiting negative stub values may
be so small that arbitrageurs do not enter the
business of eliminating mispricings.
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ENDNOTES
[1] See, e.g., the buy recommendations of BExtra-
Chancen^ (11/07/03), BWertpapier^ (17/07/03),
or BPrior Bo¨rse^ (08/08/03) on the investor rela-
tions site of Mobilcom http://www.mobilcom.de).
[2] See MITCHELL/PULVINO/STAFFORD (2002),
p. 552.
[3] See CORNELL/LIU (2001), p. 341.
[4] Throughout the paper, we refer to a parent and
a subsidiary independent of the concrete extent
of the stake.
[5] The parent company puzzle is related to the
closed-end fund discount. The latter considers
the differences in market and net asset values
of closed-end funds. Although their holdings in
publicly traded stocks are the only assets of
closed-end funds, the funds are regularly trad-
ed at a discount to the market value of their
holdings.
[6] SCHILL/ZHOU (2001) examine Internet subsid-
iary carve-outs and find that in four of the twelve
cases the value of the parent’s holdings
exceeds the total value of the parent company.
They conclude that the traditional closed-end
fund discount theories do not fully explain the
parent-to-subsidiary value relationship in Inter-
net carve-outs. LAMONT/THALER (2003) study
a sample of equity carve-outs in US technology
stocks and come to the conclusion that arbi-
trage does not eliminate the mispricings be-
cause of short-sale constraints.
[7] See MITCHELL/PULVINO/STAFFORD (2002),
p. 554.
[8] Only those parent/subsidiary pairs are included
in the sample in which the parent is a German
company. Of course, cases can be found in
which the enterprises involved are foreign
companies listed on the German stock market
(e.g., France Telekom and Orange). Moreover,
in some instances very small stakes were not
considered for practical reasons. For example,
Allianz has many other stakes. In these cases,
the determined stub value represents an upper
limit. The real stub value is even lower.
[9] The 18 subsidiaries are: AGFVAssurances
Generales de France S.A., Allianz Lebensver-
sicherungs AG, BASF AG, Beiersdorf AG,
BMW Group AG, Deutsche Bo¨rse AG, Deut-
sche Lufthansa AG, E.ON AG, Eurohypo AG,
Heidelbergcement AG, KarstadtQuelle AG,
Linde AG, MAN AG, Mu¨nchener Ru¨ck AG,
RAS Riunione Adriatica di Sicurta S.P.A.,
RWE AG, Schering AG, and Siemens AG.
[10] The 6 subsidiaries are: Allianz AG, Bayerische
Hypo- und Vereinsbank AG, Commerzbank AG,
Ergo Versicherungsgruppe AG, Fortis N.V., and
RWE AG.
[11] The 4 subsidiaries are: Commerzbank AG, IVG
Holding AG, Klo¨ckner-Werke AG, and RSE
Grundbesitz- und Beteiligungs AG.
[12] CORNELL/LIU (2001), SCHILL/ZHOU (2001)
as well as LAMONT/THALER (2003) almost
exclusively consider companies in the technol-
ogy industry, whereas MITCHELL/PULVINO/
STAFFORD (2002) examine companies from
the Old and New Economies as well.
[13] In the USA, there are, e.g., spin-off funds which
denote investments in negative stub values as
an important component of their strategy. For
example, see http://www.spinoffadvisors.com.
[14] For the definition of buy and sell signals, it
makes sense to define a certain interval for
entry and exit, instead of giving a fixed value
ratio. Thus, the threshold values are based on a
clear adjustment of market prices instead of
marginal changes. See MITCHELL/PULVINO/
STAFFORD (2002), p. 558.
[15] We use the moderate and cautious thresholds in
order to determine the sensitivity of our calcu-
lations to the buy and sell signals chosen. We
refer to these thresholds as Bmoderate^ and
Bcautious^ because increasing the buy threshold
gives the investors some cushion over their
mispricing estimates.
[16] This approach is called market adjusted return
model. Beyond that, the excess returns were
also computed with the mean adjusted return
model and the market model. The results are
FINANCIAL MARKETS AND PORTFOLIO MANAGEMENT / Volume 19, 2005 / Number 1 25
Eling and Schuhmacher: The Parent Company Puzzle on the German Stock Market
almost identical. For a similar approach see,
e.g., BROMANN/SCHIERECK/WEBER (1997),
p. 606.
[17] Transaction costs may be neglected here as
there are only two (building and termination of
the position) transactions per investment nec-
essary. The resulting costs might reduce the
calculated excess returns at most by some
tenth of a percent.
[18] The tests examine whether the average excess
return differs significantly from zero (bilateral
test). See HARTUNG (2002), p. 179 and pp.
243Y247 for further details.
[19] In calculating the average, a problematic ag-
gregation occurs over time periods of varying
length. This problem can be solved by the
determination of Bannualised^ returns. Howev-
er, on the assumption of investing at the interest
rate of 0% for the rest of the year after the
termination of an investment, the average
values calculated correspond to annualised
values. Therefore, they represent a good ap-
proximation.
[20] The excess returns in rising and falling markets
were compared using the Wilcoxon rank-sum
test. See HARTUNG (2002), pp. 513Y520. No
significant test values were observed.
[21] These observations only correspond partially to
the results of MITCHELL/PULVINO/STAF-
FORD (2002). They question the benefit of a
longYshort strategy, especially with respect to
additional payment obligations and costs of
short selling. However, in contrast to our
results, they do not find abnormally positive
returns at the parent and abnormally negative
returns at the subsidiary. See MITCHELL/
PULVINO/STAFFORD (2002), pp. 582Y583.
[22] See CORNELL/LIU (2001), p. 345.
[23] Apart from the cases with many subsidiaries
(cases 9 to 11), only 4 noteworthy changes were
observed within the examination period: Mobil-
com (case 1) reduced its stake from 73% to 53%
on 18/09/03. Media [Netcom] (case 6) increased
its stake from 30% to 60% on 01/08/02 and
again to 95% on 10/09/02. TAG Tegernsee
(case 7) increased its stake from 44% to 88%
on 25/01/02.
[24] See SCHEFFLER (2003), p. 680.
[25] See SCHILL/ZHOU (2001), p. 14.
[26] This statement applies only tendential because,
according to the Wilcoxon rank-sum test, the
difference in the volatility is insignificant.
[27] See SCHILL/ZHOU (2001), p. 17.
[28] See CORNELL/LIU (2001), pp. 345Y346.
[29] CORNELL/LIU (2001) similarly observe some
company transactions which take advantage of
a negative stub value. See CORNELL/LIU
(2001), pp. 361Y364.
[30] The Wilcoxon rank-sum test on the difference in
the trading volume of parent and subsidiary
delivers only insignificant results.
[31] See JENSEN (1986).
[32] See SHIN/STULZ (1998).
[33] See CORNELL/LIU (2001), p. 343.
[34] See SCHILL/ZHOU (2001), p. 18.
[35] Also see Table 1.
[36] See, e.g., HEGMANN (2003).
[37] The Wilcoxon rank-sum test on the difference in
the free float of parent and subsidiary is
significant at ! = 0.01.
[38] See BLITZ/ILLHARDT (1990), p. 142.
[39] See INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION OF
SECURITIES COMMISSIONS/BANK FOR IN-
TERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS (1999), p. 82.
[40] See BERNER (1999), p. 867.
[41] Only the financial services companies Euro-
clear, CEDEL, and the German Cash Associa-
tion offer institutionalised settlement systems.
However, these three only have a small share of
the security lending market. See EDELMANN/
ELLER (1996), pp. 32Y34.
[42] See HEINRICH (1999), p. 1396.
[43] Also see FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OF GER-
MANY (2002) and Figure 1.
[44] See, e.g., VOGEL (2002).
[45] See KRAMER (2002).
[46] See MITCHELL/PULVINO/STAFFORD (2002),
p. 582.
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[47] Within this conclusion we exclude the three
investments that were not terminated before 30/
12/03. However, two of these investments
(number 15 and 23) converged within 2004,
while investment number 20 did not.
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